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Abstract 
During the British Railway Mania of the 1840s the promotion and construction of new 
railways increased dramatically. These new projects were generally financed by shares with 
uncalled capital, which allowed investors to make payments on an instalment basis over a 
period of several years. There is evidence that these assets can be regarded as futures or 
options, implying that investors were purchasing highly leveraged derivatives. The leverage 
embedded in these assets multiplied both the positive returns during the boom, and the 
negative returns during the downturn. It also affected the payment schedule for investors as 
little capital was required initially, but the subsequent „calls for capital‟ resulted in 
deleveraging. 
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The British Railway Mania of the 1840s was a period of rapid asset price growth which was 
followed by a market crash, and a sustained fall in prices. Analogous to the recent „Housing 
Bubble‟, which was associated with an increase in the construction of new houses, the 
Railway Mania resulted in the promotion of many new railway lines. There were already 
about sixty railways in operation before 1843, but within just three years there were at least a 
further 1,000 new railway lines projected.  
Most of the new lines issued shares with uncalled capital, which meant that the assets could 
be purchased on an instalment basis, with investors required to make a small initial deposit 
and enter a contract to make a series of regular payments in the future. This means that they 
bear some similarities to mortgages, and although the parallels are not exact, an examination 
of this instalment plan feature during the Railway Mania can provide some insight into the 
relationship between asset price booms and leverage. 
This paper argues that the leverage which was produced by the structure of the assets resulted 
in two effects. Firstly it multiplied the returns of investors, leading to significantly higher 
returns during the boom, but higher losses during the downturn. Secondly, the payment terms 
affected investment, with the low initial deposit attracting investors but the subsequent 
deleveraging led to difficulties for shareholders. 
These issues are analysed using a new and comprehensive dataset, consisting of daily share 
prices for all railway securities listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1843 and 1850. 
This paper begins by considering whether the partially paid shares listed at this time could be 
treated as either futures or options, both of which provide a leveraged position for investors. 
A cointegration analysis relating fully paid shares and partially paid instalment plan shares 
listed during the Railway Mania suggests that there was a spot-future relationship between 
these assets, implying that the partially paid shares can be modelled as futures. There is also 
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some evidence of partially paid shares being treated as call options, with a significantly 
higher default rate on payments in those situations where it would be optimal to avoid 
payment. If partially paid shares can be treated as derivatives, then it implies that the leverage 
which results from the use of derivatives could have been available to investors during the 
Railway Mania. 
The implications of leverage during this period are then analysed, with a focus on the new 
railways which were promoted at this time. An important consequence of leverage was to 
multiply the returns which investors experienced. An analysis of first day returns suggests 
that subscribers to the IPOs of new railway companies, on average, could have doubled their 
investment if they sold their shares on the first day that they were listed on the market. 
Throughout the boom the market price was generally more than double the amount that 
investors had paid up in capital. However, this was largely due to the structure of the assets 
which gave investors exposure to price changes for only a small deposit. If investors had been 
required to pay the full cost of the asset immediately their returns would have been fairly 
modest, and the implied dividend rates which the new railways were expected to earn were 
not exceptionally high. The structure of the assets meant that during the downturn the losses 
experienced were also multiplied. 
Another important feature of leverage was to affect the schedule which investors had to make 
their payments. During the boom investors had to deposit an average of less than 10 per cent 
of their total liability. This meant that although almost two hundred new railways had been 
listed on the market at the peak, capital had only been deposited which would have been 
equivalent to fully financing about twenty new companies.  During construction there was 
substantial deleveraging when a large number of calls for capital were made, which resulted 
in price declines. 
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This analysis contributes to our understanding of the link between asset price reversals and 
leverage. It suggests that the widespread availability of leverage may be attractive during the 
boom, by multiplying positive returns and reducing the amount of capital which must be 
deposited, but it could produce difficulties during a downturn, by multiplying negative 
returns and enforcing deleveraging when payments are required. This may suggest that 
leverage is an important factor to consider when dealing with asset price booms.  
This research also contributes to the existing literature which has examined the relationship 
between asset prices and leverage. Kindleberger (2000, p.14) has suggested that a boom can 
be fed by an expansion of bank credit. Bernanke and Gertler (2001) have discussed how an 
initial increase in asset prices can improve the collateral of investors, which increases 
borrowing, which can increase demand and prices further. Aoki et al. (2002) have examined 
the links between house prices, collateral and borrowing in the United Kingdom. Detken and 
Smets (2004) have found that real credit and money growth have been quite strong before 
and during booms in 18 countries since the 1970s. 
This study also improves our understanding of the Railway Mania, which has been largely 
neglected by academic economists. This period has previously been mentioned in studies of 
the early railways, such as those by Simmons (1978), Jackman (1966) and Lewin (1968), in 
works focussing on manias and crises (Nairn, 2002, and Odlyzko, 2010), and in papers 
considering the history of accounting (Bryer, 1991, and McCartney and Arnold, 2003). 
However, there has been little detail provided on the new companies promoted at this time, 
on the assets which they issued, or on the role of leverage. 
This paper is organised as follows. The next two sections give a brief overview of the 
Railway Mania, and of the data which has been used. The third section considers whether 
partially paid shares can be viewed as futures or options. The fourth section discusses the 
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relationship between leverage and returns, whilst the fifth section considers the impact of 
leverage on the payment schedule, with the final section being a brief conclusion. 
1  Expansion during the British Railway Mania 
The first modern railway, the Liverpool and Manchester, was promoted in 1824 and finally 
opened in 1830. Within the next decade about sixty other railways obtained Parliamentary 
authorisation, with most of these projects being promoted in a minor boom during 1836 and 
1837. Whilst the economy was weak, and these railways were being constructed, share prices 
remained low and the promotion of new lines was subdued. However, between 1843 and 
August 1845, railway share prices rose rapidly, possibly because of a substantial increase in 
the dividends paid by the established railways, as suggested by Campbell (2010). A market 
index consisting of all railway shares, constructed by Campbell and Turner (2010), suggests 
that railway share prices increased by an average of 102 per cent in just under three years, as 
shown in Figure 1.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 1 >> 
As with some other periods of rapid asset price growth, such as the South Sea Bubble of 
1720, the boom of 1825, and the Dot-Com Bubble of the 1990s, there was a substantial 
increase in the promotion of new companies during the Railway Mania, and the established 
railways also expanded rapidly. The Times estimated that there were 1,238 new railway 
projects in 1845 alone
1
, a figure which itself understated the extent of promotion as 335 lines 
not on this list went on to petition Parliament
2
. The number of railway securities listed on the 
London Stock Exchange underestimates the extent of promotion, as only a small proportion 
ever achieved a listing, but the number of listed securities follows the pattern in prices with a 
lag, as shown in Figure 1. 
                                               
1 The Times, November 17, 1845, p.4 
2 The Times, January 14, 1846, p.6 
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Most of the new schemes issued partially paid shares with uncalled capital, which meant that 
investors paid a small deposit and would then make future payments when the process of 
construction required it. Shares issued during the Railway Mania, and throughout much of the 
eighteenth and nineteenth century, were quoted with a nominal value, a par value and the 
market price. The nominal value of the share was the total amount that original shareholders 
were initially liable to pay to the company. The par value of the share was the amount that 
shareholders had already paid to the company.  
The difference between the nominal and par value reflected uncalled capital, which was the 
amount that shareholders were still liable to pay to the company. Uncalled capital could be 
used in several ways, with banks and insurance companies generally retaining it as a reserve, 
but the railways tended to call it up in regular instalments to finance the construction of their 
lines. Figure 2 illustrates the rapid increase in nominal value during the boom in railway 
shares, compared to a more gradual rise in par value. This reflects the issuance of the new 
securities which had only a small proportion of capital initially paid up. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 2 >> 
Concerns were raised by The Times
3
 and the Economist
4
 that the amount of railway 
promotion and construction would eventually result in difficulties for shareholders and the 
economy, as investors would face difficulties in paying the „calls for capital‟, and investment 
would be diverted from other uses to the railways. Railway share prices fell by 18 per cent 
between mid-October and the end of November 1845 as the promotion of new railway 
schemes reached unprecedented levels. 
 
                                               
3 The Times, July 1, 1845, p.4 
4 Economist, October 4, 1845, p.950-953 
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Many of the railways promoted at the height of the boom never received Parliamentary 
authorisation, and others faced difficulties when they began to lay their line, but the extent of 
railway construction was still impressive. Estimates by Mitchell (1964) suggest that railway 
investment represented 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1846, 6.7 per cent in 1847, and 4.7 per cent in 
1848. However, the extent of railway expansion proved to be unsustainable, with the size of 
investment being amongst a range of factors blamed by a Parliamentary Committee for the 
Commercial Crisis of 1847
5
. Concerns about overexpansion led several of the leading 
railways to announce they would not proceed with much of the planned construction in 
October 1848
6
. It was not until near the end of the decade that most of the remaining 
construction had been completed, and the new railways began to operate. 
2 Data 
Data on the number of shares in issue, the nominal value, the par value, and the market price 
of every railway security listed on the London Stock Exchange between 1843 and 1850 was 
obtained on a daily basis from the Railway Times. This newspaper was the leading railway 
periodical during this period, and although it was published weekly it contained tables which 
reported the daily share prices of each railway security. Data from each weekly table, 
containing an average of 242.1 securities for each of the 417 weeks in the sample, was 
computerised and each table was then merged to produce a comprehensive dataset. Due to the 
high number of listings and delistings the total number of securities included in the dataset is 
868, representing 442 railway companies. 
Preference shares (88 securities) and assets issued by railways outside Great Britain and 
Ireland (84 securities) were excluded. When some companies were first listed some of the 
data on the number of shares, nominal value or par value were not reported. In these cases the 
                                               
5 Parliamentary Papers, 1847-48, VIII, Pt. I, p.4 and Pt. III, p.3 
6 Economist, November 4, 1848, p.1241 
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next reported data was assumed to be correct for the missing period. If this data was not 
reported at any future period, the Railway Shareholders’ Manual (Tuck, 1845) was used to 
obtain the missing details. There were 150 securities where data on either the number of 
shares or par value could not be ascertained. 
Several additional variables were also included. The value of uncalled capital for each asset 
was calculated as the difference between the nominal value and the par value of that asset. 
Data on dividends, for the subset of companies which were also reported in the Course of the 
Exchange (a share list produced by a stockbroker) were also recorded. The risk-free rate was 
approximated as the yield on Government Consols, which was also obtained from the Course 
of the Exchange. 
3 Embedded Leverage 
The standard approach to obtaining a leveraged position in an asset is to obtain credit, 
possibly from a financial institution, and then use this to purchase the asset. However, 
leverage can also be produced by entering into a derivatives contract. Rather than borrowing 
the full amount at the start, there is an obligation to make future payments embedded within 
the asset. Investors have effectively borrowed the funds from the counterparty. By paying a 
small deposit, and making a commitment to future payments, it is possible to obtain exposure 
to the movements of the underlying asset.  
In the following sections it is suggested that it may be appropriate to regard the partially paid 
shares issued during the Railway Mania as either futures or options. Consequently, the 
leverage which results from these asset classes may have been available to investors during 
this period. 
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3.1 Partially Paid Shares as Futures 
The relationship between fully paid and partially paid shares can be illustrated by a no 
arbitrage argument. Investors should receive the same return from purchasing a fully paid up 
share, or from purchasing a partially paid up share and paying the remaining liability. 
Assuming that investors could not default on their liability, a partially paid share can be 
modelled as a future contract with a fixed payment in the future, and the fully paid share can 
be regarded as the underlying security. The relationship between the price of a future contract 
and an underlying security is given in Equation 1, as stated by Hull (2003, p.50), adjusted to 
account for dividends which can be expressed as a percentage of the future payment. 
𝑆 = 𝑓 + 𝐾𝑒(−𝑟+𝑞)𝑡  
where: S = Price of underlying security 
  f = Price of future contract 
  K = Size of future payment 
  r = Risk-free interest rate 
  q =  Dividend rate 
(1) 
Applying the relevant variables during the Railway Mania produces Equation 2. This 
functional form has also been proposed by Dale et al. (2005) in their analysis of the pricing of 
different issues of South Sea stock which had different par values. 
𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝑈𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒
(−𝑟+𝑞)𝑡  
where: P = Price of asset 
U = Uncalled capital 
  r = Risk-free interest rate 
  q =  Dividend rate 
(2) 
To illustrate the implications of uncalled capital on the market price of an asset an example 
will be used of the relationship between two assets issued by the Great Western Railway 
(GWR), before a more comprehensive analysis of other companies. The GWR has been 
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chosen as it had both fully paid and partially paid shares listed on the market for almost the 
entire sample period, and longer than any other company. At the beginning of 1843 two 
„GWR Half Shares‟ had a nominal value of £100, and a par value of £100, meaning that 
original subscribers were initially liable to pay up £100, and this full amount of £100 had 
already been called up. In 1843 the „GWR Original Shares‟ had a nominal value of £100, and 
a par value of £65. This meant that shareholders had already paid the company a total of £65, 
but they were also liable to pay a further £35 at some time in the future. During the period 
between 1843 and 1850 the two „GWR Half Shares‟ retain their par value of £100 throughout 
the period, but the par value of the „GWR Original Shares‟ rise in a series of instalments from 
£65 to £100. 
When only the market prices of the assets are compared the difference in prices appears to 
change over time, as suggested in Panel A of Figure 3. However, the previous discussion 
suggests that this is actually a comparison between the price of an ordinary share and a future 
contract. A fairer comparison would be between the fully paid „GWR Half Shares‟ and the 
implied price of an equivalent fully paid „GWR Original Share‟. This implied price can be 
estimated using Equation 2, by adjusting the price of the partially paid „GWR Original Share‟ 
to take account of uncalled capital. Once these adjustments have been made, for each day of 
the sample between 1843 and 1850, there appears to be a close relationship between the 
implied prices of the fully paid shares, as shown in Panel B of Figure 3. 
<< INSERT FIGURE 3 >> 
It is possible to introduce a more systematic analysis, which can be used to examine a wider 
sample of companies, by testing for cointegration. By using the Engle-Granger 2-step 
approach (Engle and Granger, 1987) it is possible to test if the difference between the two 
series is stationary. This involves regressing the level of price 1 on the level of price 2, and 
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testing the residual using the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test. If the ADF test is 
significant it is possible to reject the presence of a unit root and conclude that the two series 
are cointegrated. This test for cointegration has been carried out for the pair of GWR assets 
discussed above, and then repeated for all other qualifying pairs of assets. To be included in 
the analysis a pair of assets had to be issued by the same company, have the same pro rata 
dividend rights, and both be listed on the stock market for at least one year, and be traded on 
average at least once per week. Any assets which delisted and were then relisted with a 
different nominal or par value were excluded. The size of the ADF statistic, and its 
significance, for each cointegration test is shown in Table 1. The results suggest that when 
uncalled capital is accounted for, either as a separate variable or to produce a notional fully 
paid share, there is evidence of cointegration for almost every pair of assets.  
<< INSERT TABLE 1 >> 
The cointegrating vector has also been estimated for each of these asset pairs. A vector with a 
value of 1 would suggest that the partially paid share was priced, on average, the same as the 
fully paid share. A vector greater than 1 would suggest that the fully paid share may have 
been overpriced, and a vector below 1 may suggest the fully paid share was slightly 
underpriced. The cointegrating vector was estimated using Dynamic OLS, which includes 
past, present and future values of the change in X in the regression, as this is efficient in large 
samples as suggested by Stock and Watson (2003, p.557), with the results shown in Table 2. 
There appears to be a cointegrating vector close to 1 for most pairs of assets. 
<< INSERT TABLE 2 >> 
These results taken together, suggest that the no arbitrage relationship proposed in Equation 2 
provides a good explanation of how shares with uncalled capital were priced. Using the most 
realistic assumptions of a discount rate (-r + q) between 0 per cent and 10 per cent shows a 
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strong pattern of cointegration, and a cointegrating vector close to 1. The only exceptions 
involved two assets issued by the York and North Midland (YNM) for Extensions and a 
Scarborough Branch which only cointegrate using a very high dividend rate. It is not clear 
from Tuck (1848) or company reports
7
 whether these two exceptions had different dividend 
rights, but as they were both issued specifically for branch lines, it is possible that this was 
the case. These exceptions do not negate the general finding that investors were pricing 
partially paid shares as if they were future contracts, which meant that investors who 
purchased these assets were effectively purchasing leveraged futures. 
3.2 Partially Paid Shares as Options 
The discussion has thus far assumed that the contract which subscribers entered into to pay 
future instalments was a binding obligation. However, there has been the suggestion that it 
may be better to treat these assets as options, as the holder may have had the right, but not the 
obligation, to pay a future amount and obtain a fully paid share. Shea (2007b) has argued that 
this option to avoid future payments, and forfeit the partially paid share, was present during 
the South Sea Bubble and can explain why the prices of different partially paid shares 
diverged. 
The relationship between the price of the partially paid share, the call option, and the fully 
paid share, the underlying security, can be shown from put-call parity, as shown in Equation 
3. The fully paid share may be said to have price S, with the partially paid share having price 
c. The amount which an investor must pay to exercise the option and obtain a fully paid share 
is the size of the uncalled capital, which is the sum of future instalments due, and can be 
referred to as K.  
                                               
7
 Railway Times, 1843-50 
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𝑆 =  𝑐 + 𝐾𝑒−𝑟𝑡 − 𝑝 
where: S = Price of underlying security 
  c = Price of call option 
  K = Size of future payment 
  r = Risk-free interest rate 
  q =  Dividend rate 
(3) 
Applying the relevant variables during the Railway Mania would produce Equation 4. The 
difference in the implied price of a fully paid share when the partially paid share is treated as 
a future contract, and when it is treated as an option contract, is the put value. 
𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 = 𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 + 𝑈𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙  𝑒
(−𝑟+𝑞)𝑡 − 𝑝 
where: P = Price of asset 
U = Uncalled capital 
  r = Risk-free interest rate 
  q =  Dividend rate 
  p =  Put Value 
(4) 
During the Railway Mania the legal framework for this issue was set down in the Companies‟ 
Clauses Consolidation Act
8
. This set standard clauses which companies could include in their 
constitutions. By this act a shareholder was to be given 21 days notice before an instalment 
was due. If the instalment was not paid on time the company could charge interest on the 
amount outstanding. If a shareholder had still failed to pay after two months, the company 
could sue the shareholder and attempt to recover the amount due with interest, or the directors 
could declare the share forfeited. At least another two months had to pass before the 
declaration of forfeiture could be confirmed at a general meeting, which would allow the 
company to sell the forfeited shares. 
                                               
8
 Parliamentary Papers, 1845, II, p.226-227. 
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By suing shareholders the company could hope to obtain the full amount due, but they would 
have to pay legal expenses. By forfeiting the share these expenses could be avoided, and the 
company could sell the share in the secondary market. During the construction of the early 
railways (pre-1843), the practice of forfeiting shares seems to have been preferred by at least 
some of the companies. The Cheltenham and Great Western Railway had originally issued 
7,500 shares, but by 1843 only 5,693 remained in issue, with the rest having been forfeited 
for non-payment of calls (MacDermot, 1964, p.83). In 1845 the Economist
9
 noted that 
„hitherto it has been the practice in the numerous cases where calls were not complied with, 
for the directors to declare the shares forfeited, and not to seek recourse back upon the 
original shareholders. In this way in one of the existing companies, no less than 8,000 out of 
the entire quantity of 12,000 shares, or two-thirds, were forfeited before the line was even 
begun.‟ 
It should have been in the best interests of an investor to forfeit a share if the amount which 
the investor was required to pay was greater than the value of that share after that payment 
had been made. The default condition should therefore have been given by Equation 5. 
𝑆 − 𝐾 < 0 
where: S = Price of asset after payment of instalment 
 K = Size of instalment 
(5) 
By analysing data on the arrears outstanding on the instalments due on the shares of various 
railway companies, taken from Parliamentary Papers (1848, LXIII, p.275-442), it is possible 
to estimate whether investors chose to forfeit a partially paid share based on the criteria given 
in Equation 5. The data lists each instalment required on each asset for many of the railways. 
It states the amount that investors had paid on that instalment and the amount which was still 
outstanding in August 1848, when the data was collected. It does not distinguish between 
                                               
9 Economist, October 18, 1845, p.1013 
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those instalments in arrears which had already been forfeited, and those which had not. This 
complicates the analysis of whether an investor had definitely decided to forfeit the shares or 
whether they were delaying the payment decision until the company forced them to decide. 
To overcome this difficulty it is possible to analyse various scenarios regarding when a 
decision of forfeiture was made. Alternative scenarios were considered which looked at 
whether companies enforced forfeiture if payment was not made after either two months, four 
months, one year or two years. Table 3 shows how many times the default condition was met 
under the various scenarios. According to the first scenario investors could have waited two 
months after the instalment was due, and decided on the deadline whether to pay the 
instalment. The criteria for default on a particular instalment was therefore whether the price 
of the asset, two months after the instalment due date, was less than the size of the instalment. 
Only those instalments where at least two months had passed could be included in the sample 
so only those instalments due before June 1848 were included. The other scenarios were 
analysed in a similar manner. 
<< INSERT TABLE 3 >> 
The results for the timeframe of 4 months, 1 year and 2 years suggest that there was a 
significantly higher default rate when it was in the best interests of investors to default. This 
would seem to suggest that some investors decided to pay or not, based on expected utility, 
rather than on ability to pay. However, the results imply that this was not universal. If the 
partially paid shares had been pure call options it would be expected that there would have 
been a zero default rate when the default criteria was not met, and 100 per cent when the 
criteria was met. Foote et al. (2008) find a similarly low default rate amongst home owners in 
the 1990s with negative equity. Although it may be inappropriate to assume that partially 
paid shares were pure call options, the difference in default rates depending on the default 
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criteria suggests that some investors did treat them this way, and would mean that some 
investors were purchasing leveraged options. 
4 Multiplying Returns 
A major effect of leverage is to multiply the returns which investors experience. This section 
will consider the impact which the leveraged nature of partially paid shares had for investors 
during the Railway Mania, initially examining first day returns before considering pricing 
throughout the period. 
4.1 First Day Returns 
Investors who subscribed to railway IPOs were asked to pay the par value of the share as a 
deposit. They would then be liable to pay calls up to the amount of the nominal value of the 
shares when the company requested it. An investor who subscribed to IPOs in the primary 
market and then sold those shares on the first day that they traded on the secondary market 
would receive a return given by Equation 6. 
𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 =  
𝑃𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 − 𝑍𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
𝑍𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙
 
where: r = Return 
P = Price 
Z = Par Value 
(6) 
If investors had been required to pay the total cost of the asset immediately, rather than in 
instalments, their return can be calculated by Equation 7. The price of the fully paid share can 
be implied by adjusting the price of a partially paid share according to the futures pricing 
relationship given in Equation 2, or by the options pricing relationship given in Equation 4. 
The cost of the fully paid share can be implied by adjusting the par value to include the 
discounted sum of future calls.  
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𝑟𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 =  
𝑃𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 − 𝑍𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
𝑍𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙
 
where:  r = Return 
 P = Price 
Z = Par Value 
(7) 
To analyse the impact of uncalled capital on the returns which subscribers to new companies 
could experience, the first day returns of 167 new railway companies listed on the London 
Stock Exchange between 1843 and 1850 are analysed. The criteria for inclusion in this 
analysis was that the asset had to be traded at least once, and full details of the nominal value, 
par value and the share price had to be available. Those securities where assets were 
subsequently relisted with changes in the amount of uncalled capital were excluded. Only the 
original security issued by any company was included to avoid multiple observations for each 
company.  
The implied price of a fully paid share, assuming that the partially paid share was a future 
contract, was estimated using Equation 2 by adjusting the price of the future contract for the 
discounted sum of future payments. The risk-free rate was set as 3 per cent, which was close 
to the yield of Government Consols throughout the period, and as these new companies could 
not pay a dividend until they had completed construction and began operation, the dividend 
rate was set to 0 per cent. If an asset eventually became fully paid up during the sample 
period between 1843 and 1850 then the actual times when the instalments were due was used. 
If an asset delisted before becoming fully paid up then it was assumed that the instalments 
had been due in five equal payments within the next two years after the asset delisted. As the 
average time to becoming fully paid up was 3.2 years, and most assets were listed for at least 
several months before delisting, this seems to be a reasonable assumption. 
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To imply the price of a fully paid share, when the partially paid share was treated as an option 
contract, the Black-Scholes formula for a European call option (Black and Scholes, 1973) 
was used. The price of the underlying fully paid share was implied by using the partially paid 
share price as the call option price, and estimates of the risk-free rate, the time to exercise, the 
strike price and volatility. The risk-free rate was set to 3 per cent, as the yield on government 
Consols remained close to this rate throughout most of the period. The time to exercise was 
set to the difference between the current date and the time that the next call was due, plus one 
year, as the enforcement of forfeiture probably did not occur immediately, as discussed 
above. The strike price was equivalent to the remaining uncalled liability, adjusted to reflect 
the 5 per cent penalty interest which was imposed during the year between the instalment due 
date and the enforcement deadline. The median volatility of fully paid shares within the 
sample was 28 per cent. The volatility of partially paid shares plus the uncalled liability, 
which would have reflected the volatility of a fully paid share if the embedded put value was 
zero, was 27 per cent. For this analysis a volatility of 30 per cent is used. 
It is obviously unrealistic to assume that investors in the 1840s could have implemented a 
pricing formula which was not published until the 1970s. However, the additional value of 
having the right, but not the obligation, to purchase an asset had been well understood for 
some time, with Murphy (2009) discussing the trading of options as far back as the 1690s. 
The use of the formula in this paper is to find an approximation of the impact of the right to 
default, rather than to obtain exact valuations. 
In each instance the estimated return was adjusted by subtracting the market return on that 
day, to obtain the abnormal return. The difference between the returns which partially paid 
shares actually experienced, and the returns which would have been experienced if only fully 
paid shares had been issued, has also been calculated, as shown in Table 4. 
18 
 
<< INSERT TABLE 4 >> 
The size of the return which subscribers to new schemes could obtain during the boom was 
substantial, with a mean return of 76.2 per cent in 1844, and 106.7 per cent in 1845. This is 
consistent with commentary during the period, such as the remark by the Railway Investment 
Guide (1845, p.10) that „it will be obvious that the party who has had certain shares allotted 
to him, which rise to a premium (as they almost invariably do, at least for a time) has the 
whole of that premium for his profit. By this means, persons possessing only sufficient 
capital to pay the deposit, may more than double it in a day‟. 
However, the returns which would have been experienced if only fully paid shares had been 
issued was just 5.5 per cent in 1844 and 7.1 per cent in 1845 if the partially paid share was 
regarded as a future contract, or -4.5 per cent in 1844 and -6.3 per cent in 1845 if the partially 
paid share was regarded as an option contract. The difference between the returns for 
partially paid shares and fully paid shares was substantial and significant during these years.  
These results suggest that the first day returns for underlying ordinary shares were not 
particularly high, but the return which was experienced was considerable because the full 
premium was embedded in an asset on which only a small deposit was required. The impact 
of uncalled capital was to multiply the returns initially experienced by investors in new 
companies. Thus the dramatic returns which investors experienced at this time from investing 
in new companies were at least partially due to the effects of leverage.  
4.2 Pricing throughout Mania 
To estimate the impact on shareholder returns throughout the Mania a similar analysis can be 
repeated for each day of the sample period. If an investor subscribed to all new railway IPOs, 
and then paid all subsequent calls when they were due, their cost at any particular time can be 
calculated as the sum of the par values of all new companies. The market capitalisation at any 
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particular time reflected the price at which investors could sell their shares. Consequently, a 
simple measure for estimating the return to investors was the price/par ratio. A price/par ratio 
of 1 suggested that the current market price equalled the amount which had already been 
invested. A price/par ratio of 2 suggested that the original investors had made a 100 per cent 
return, whilst a price/par ratio of 0.5 suggested investors had lost 50 per cent of their original 
investment. 
The average price/par ratios for the established railways and new railways were calculated for 
each day between 1844 and 1850, and are illustrated in Figure 4. The price/par ratio of the 
new companies reached a peak of 2.74, which meant that an investor who had subscribed to 
all the new companies would have earned a return of 174 per cent. The price for each 
equivalent fully paid share, when the partially paid share is considered as a future contract, 
has been calculated using Equation 2 for each day of the sample. Assumptions regarding the 
time when calls were due were the same as for the analysis of first day returns. Alternative 
scenarios for the discount rate have been employed, being -10 per cent, 0 per cent and +10 
per cent. The implied total market capitalisation and the total par value for all of the new 
railways have been used to calculate the implied price/par ratio for the industry, for each day, 
and is shown in Panel A of Figure 4.  
<< INSERT FIGURE 4 >> 
The implied price of each equivalent fully paid share, when the partially paid share is treated 
as an option contract, has been calculated using the Black-Scholes formula (Black and 
Scholes, 1973), using the same assumptions as for the analysis of first day returns. To obtain 
a range of scenarios volatilities of 20 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent were analysed. The 
implied total market capitalisation and total par values of all new railways were related to 
estimate the implied price/par ratio for the industry as shown in Panel B of Figure 4. 
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When partially paid shares are treated as a future contract the average price/par ratio of the 
equivalent fully paid shares of new railways reached a peak of between 1.12 and 1.18 
depending on what assumptions are made about the discount rate. When partially paid shares 
are treated as option contracts, even at the market peak, the implied prices of fully paid shares 
of new companies were lower than their par value, meaning that they were at a discount.  
Unreported analysis also considers alternative scenarios for the timing of calls, and also 
implies prices of fully paid shares if the partially paid shares were treated as compound call 
options. In each instance the results suggest that the returns which investors would have 
experienced from investing in fully paid shares would have been relatively low, but due to the 
leveraged nature of the partially paid shares the returns which they actually experienced were 
substantial. 
4.3 Relative Pricing of New Railways 
These estimates of the prices of equivalent fully paid shares allow an estimation of whether 
the shares of new railways were priced consistently with other assets. As the new railways 
could not pay a dividend until they had finished construction and began operation, which 
generally took two to three years, it was not possible for investors to initially price them 
using their dividends. However, it is possible to use an approximation to calculate what 
dividend they would eventually have to achieve to produce a similar return to the non-
railways and established railways. The dividend yield can be expressed in terms of the 
dividend/par ratio and price/par ratio, as shown in Equation 8. 
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑 𝑌𝑖𝑒𝑙𝑑 =  
𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑑/𝑃𝑎𝑟
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒/𝑃𝑎𝑟
 
(8) 
The average price/par ratio of the new railways peaked at 1.16 if partially paid shares are 
treated as future contracts, assuming a 3 per cent discount rate. During 1845 the non-railways 
were trading at an average dividend yield of 4.5 per cent, so to achieve a similar yield the 
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new railways should have been producing a dividend/par ratio of 5.2 per cent. This is a lower 
bound estimate, as it does not take account of the much greater uncertainty surrounding the 
new railways, or the foregone dividends during the construction phase, but it provides an 
approximation for required performance. The dividend/par ratio of the established railways 
peaked at 7.2 per cent during the Mania. An analysis of the prospectuses of 85 new railways 
collected from advertisements in the Railway Times (1843-45) suggests that the promoters of 
these new railways encouraged investors to expect an average dividend/par ratio of 7.9 per 
cent. The lower bound estimate of the required dividend/par ratio to justify the price of the 
new railways was therefore much lower than either the established railways or the 
prospectuses of the new railways suggested was possible.  
The factors which contributed to the decline in the dividends of the established railways also 
affected the new railways, and the average dividend/par ratio amongst those new railways 
which were actually constructed reached a peak of just 4.6 per cent in 1849, and fell to 1.9 
per cent by the end of 1850. Given the actual performance which was eventually achieved, 
the new railways provided a low return, but given the information available at the time the 
new railways were not obviously overpriced, even at the market peak.  
5 Payment Schedule 
 
The previous section focused on the effect which leverage has on returns, but the impact on 
the schedule with which investors must make their payments may also be important. Rather 
than paying the full amount initially, the use of leverage makes it possible to pay a small 
initial deposit and then make a series of payments in the future. The difference between the 
amount that investors were liable to pay, the nominal value, and the amount which they had 
paid so far, the par value, is reported in Table 5 for the end of each year. Only companies 
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where the details of both the nominal and par values are available are included in the 
analysis.  
<< INSERT TABLE 5 >> 
It can be seen from Table 5 that the total nominal value of new railways at the end of 1844 
was £39.6m, and at the end of was £158.0m. In contrast, the total par value of these new 
railways was just £3.7m in 1844, and £15.6m in 1845, which means that during the boom in 
prices and promotions investors had been asked to pay up less than 10 per cent of their total 
liability. This implies that although 44 new railway companies had been listed by the end of 
1844, investors had only provided enough capital to fully finance 4.1 companies. By the end 
of 1845, when 186 new railway companies were listed, investors had provided enough capital 
to entirely finance just 18.5 companies. 
The ability to obtain exposure to the price movements of assets without having to 
immediately find the total capital required may have contributed to the number of new 
railways promoted at this time, and to the enthusiasm with which investors subscribed to the 
new schemes. The Economist (April 5, 1845, p.310) noted that „it is one of their peculiar 
characteristics but yet not less ultimately dangerous and deceptive on that account, that from 
the delay of procuring the act and getting it into operation the period when the main bulk of 
capital is required is remote from that when the greatest excitement and speculation exists, 
and no immediate check is therefore experienced by calls of capital.‟  
When payments were eventually demanded, the resulting deleveraging may have contributed 
to a decline in prices. Investors were required to make regular and sizeable payments on their 
partially paid shares during the construction phase, especially between 1846 and 1848, as 
shown in Figure 5. The extent of the capital required was substantial, with railway 
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construction accounting for an estimated 5.7 per cent of GDP in 1846, 6.7 per cent in 1847 
and 4.7 per cent in 1848 (Mitchell, 1964). 
<< INSERT FIGURE 5 >> 
When investors were required to make a payment on an instalment they had several choices. 
The simplest method was to use cash from their portfolio but they may have had liquidity 
constraints, making this very difficult. They could attempt to borrow from a financial 
institution but during the downturn, and particularly during the Commercial Crisis of 1847, 
this could only be done at a high rate of interest. They could effectively borrow from the 
railway company by delaying their payment of the instalment which would lead to a penalty 
interest rate of 5 per cent per annum, but this was only available for a limited period of time, 
with the railways only required to offer this alternative for two months after an instalment 
was due
10
. They may also have had the option of avoiding payment, which led to forfeiture of 
the asset but, as previously discussed, this would only be optimal in a limited number of 
occasions and may have been an ambiguous right. This left them with two commonly used 
alternatives. They could sell the asset on which the liability was due, or sell another asset to 
raise cash which could be used to pay the liability. The impact of both of these alternatives 
was to increase the supply, and lower the price, of railway shares. 
The Times had issued warnings at the height of the Mania about the extent and impact of 
future calls for capital. They said „soon or late the day will come when an untold proportion 
of this year‟s scripholders will be doubly pressed, no longer able to suffer the sums they have 
already paid to remain buried in the earthworks of an unfinished line, much less to pay up the 
quick recurring calls of the company‟11. The Economist12 noted that „every fresh call that was 
                                               
10 Parliamentary Papers, 1845, II, p.226-227. 
11 The Times, July 30, 1845 
12 Economist, October 21, 1848, p.1187 
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made upon exhausted shareholders was attended by one of two effects – either the shares 
themselves upon which the call had been made were sold in order to avoid payment, or some 
other shares were sold in order to raise the money for that purpose. There was constantly an 
increasing number of sellers, and a constantly diminishing number of buyers.‟ This led to the 
result that „lines in course of construction in place of increasing in price as more and more 
capital became invested in them, have after each new call fallen about as much as they should 
have risen.‟ 
To estimate the impact which these calls for capital had on prices, 971 changes in capital 
were analysed as shown in Table 6. When a company issued a call, its return during that 
week was calculated, with the abnormal return being calculated as the company return minus 
the market return. If an asset was not traded in the week during which the call was made the 
calculation was carried out for the week that it was next traded.  
<< INSERT TABLE 6 >> 
A regression was then conducted, with the abnormal return as the dependent variable, and 
just a constant with no independent variables. The coefficient of the constant reveals the 
average abnormal return, whilst the standard error can be used to calculate whether the 
average abnormal return was significantly greater than zero. This process was repeated for 
the sample as a whole, and for each year individually. It was then extended to incorporate a 
longer sample window, with both three weeks and five weeks being considered. The three 
week window included one week prior to the event, the week of the event and one week after 
the event. The five week window included two weeks prior to the event, the week of the 
event, and two weeks after the event. In these cases the cumulative abnormal return for each 
event was calculated and used in the regressions as the dependent variable. 
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An analysis of all 971 calls for capital between 1843 and 1850 suggests that a share had an 
average abnormal return of -9.7 per cent in the week that a call was made on it, as shown in 
Table 8. If a three week period is analysed, there was an average abnormal return of -8.4 per 
cent, and if a five week period is considered, there was an average abnormal return of -4.7 per 
cent. The most likely reason for the falls in prices was investors selling some shares to pay 
the instalments on others. The extent of these declines, and the number of calls which were 
made, suggest that this exercised a considerable downward pressure on prices during this 
period. This implies that the process of deleveraging contributed to the decline in prices 
during the downturn.  
6 Conclusion 
Using an extensive dataset of daily data this paper has analysed the pricing of assets with 
uncalled capital during the British Railway Mania. It began by establishing that partially paid 
assets may be regarded as either futures or options. This implies that investors who purchased 
these assets were effectively purchasing highly leveraged derivatives. 
The first impact of this leverage was to multiply the returns to investors. First day returns for 
the partially paid shares were significantly higher than the returns which investors would 
have received if they had only been able to purchase fully paid shares. The returns to 
investors in new railways were substantially greater throughout the boom due to the leverage 
embedded in the assets, but during the downturn negative returns were also multiplied. Once 
the effects of leverage have been accounted for, the implied prices of new companies were 
not unjustifiably high, even at the peak in prices.  
The second impact of leverage was to affect the payment schedule which investors faced. 
Investors could subscribe to shares in new companies for a small deposit, but were required 
to make a series of payments in the future. This meant that although almost two hundred new 
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railways had been listed on the market at its peak, enough capital had been provided to 
finance only about twenty of them. When payments were subsequently required, the resulting 
deleveraging was associated with price declines. 
These results suggest that leverage may have contributed to both the initial rises, and 
subsequent declines, in asset prices during the Railway Mania. This could imply that leverage 
is a factor which regulators should consider when attempting to maintain financial stability. It 
may appear to be attractive during a boom, but it can lead to problems in a downturn.  
27 
 
Bibliography 
Allen, F. & Gale, D. (1997), „Bubbles and Crises‟, The Economic Journal, vol. 110(460), pp. 
236-55.  
Aoki, K., Proudman, J., and Vlieghe, G. (2002). „Houses as Collateral: Has the Link between 
House Prices and Consumption in the U.K. Changed?‟, Economic Policy Review, 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York, May, pp. 163-77 
Bernanke, B.S., and Gertler, M. (2001). 'Should Central Banks Respond to Movements in 
Asset Prices?'  American Economic Review, vol. 91 (May), pp. 253-57. 
Black, F. & Scholes, M. (1973), „The Pricing of Options and Corporate Liabilities‟, Journal 
of Political Economy, vol. 81, no. 3, pp. 637. 
Campbell, G.  (2010), “Cross-Section of a „Bubble‟: Stock Prices and Dividends during the 
British Railway Mania”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Campbell, G. and Turner, J. (2010), “„The Greatest Bubble in History‟: Stock Prices during 
the British Railway Mania”, SSRN Working Paper. 
Course of the Exchange (1843-50). 
Dale, R., Johnson, J.E.V. & Tang, L. (2005), „Financial Markets can Go Mad: Evidence of 
Irrational Behaviour during the South Sea Bubble‟, Economic History Review, vol. 
58, no. 2, pp. 233-271. 
Detken, C. and Smets, F. (2004), 'Asset Price Booms and Monetary Policy', ECB Working 
Paper no. 364. 
Economist (1843-50). 
Engle, R. F. and Granger, C.W.J. (1987), „Co-Integration and Error Correction: 
Representation, Estimation, and Testing‟, Econometrica, vol. 55, pp.251-276. 
Foote, C.L., Gerardi, K. & Willen, P.S. (2008), „Negative Equity and Foreclosure: Theory 
and evidence‟, Journal of Urban Economics, vol. 64(2), pp. 234-245. 
Froot, K.A. & Dabora, E.M. (1999), „How are Stocks Affected by the Location of Trade?‟, 
Journal of Financial Economics, vol. 53, pp. 189-216. 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. & Zingales, L. (2009), „Moral and Social Constraints to Strategic 
Default on Mortgages‟, CEPR Working Paper. 
Hull, J. (2003), Options, Futures, and other Derivatives, Pearson Prentice Hall.  
Jackman, W.T. (1966), The Development of Transportation in Modern England, Cass. 
Johansen, S. (1988), „Statistical Analysis Of Cointegration Vectors‟, Journal of Economic 
Dynamics and Control, vol. 12, no. 2-3, pp. 231-254. 
Kindleberger, C.P. (2000), Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, John 
Wiley & Sons.  
Lamont, O.A. & Thaler, R.H. (2003), „Can the Market Add and Subtract? Mispricing in Tech 
Stock Carve-outs‟, Journal of Political Economy, vol. 111, no. 2, pp. 227-268. 
Lewin, H.G. (1968), The Railway Mania and its Aftermath, 1845-1852 (Being a Sequel to 
Early British Railways), Rev. Edn, A. M. Kelley.  
28 
 
MacDermot, E.T. (1964), History of the Great Western Railway, Ian Allan Ltd. 
Mitchell, B.R. (1964), „The Coming of the Railway and United Kingdom Economic Growth‟, 
Journal of Economic History, vol. 24, no. 3, pp. 315-336.  
Murphy, A.L. (2009), „Trading Options before Black-Scholes: A Study of the Market in Late 
Seventeenth Century London‟, Economic History Review, vol. 62, no. S1, pp. 8-30.  
Nairn, A. (2002), Engines that Move Markets: Technology Investing from Railroads to the 
Internet and Beyond, Wiley. 
Parliamentary Papers (1847-48), LXIII, p.275-442 „Return of the names of railways for 
which acts have been obtained; calls made; amount received and remaining due; sums 
borrowed which remain owing; balance of capital uncalled for, and of money which 
the companies retain power to borrow; and, periods for which the companies have 
postponed making further calls.‟ 
Parliamentary Papers (1847-48), VIII, Pt. I, p.1, „Reports from the Secret Committee on 
Commercial Distress; with an Index‟. 
Pollins, H. (1971), Britain's Railways: An Industrial History, David and Charles (Publishers) 
Limited. 
Railway Times (1843-50). 
Shea, G.S. (2007a), „Understanding Financial Derivatives During the South Sea Bubble: The 
Case of the South Sea Subscription Shares‟, Oxford Economic Papers, vol. 59, no. 
Supplement 1, pp. i73. 
Shea, G.S. (2007b), „Financial Market Analysis Can Go Mad (in the Search for Irrational 
Behaviour During the South Sea Bubble)‟, Economic History Review, vol. 60, no. 4, 
pp. 742-765. 
Simmons, J. (1978), The Railway in England and Wales, 1830-1914, vol.1, Leicester 
University Press.  
Stock, J.H. & Watson, M.W. (2003), Introduction to Econometrics, Addison Wesley. 
The Railway Investment Guide. How to Make Money in Railway Shares: A Series of Hints 
and Advice to Parties Speculating (1845). 
The Times (1843-50). 
Tuck, H. (1845), The Railway Shareholder's Manual; Or Practical Guide to All the Railways 
in the World, Sixth Edition, Effingham Wilson. 
Tuck, H. (1848), The Railway Shareholder's Manual; Or Practical Guide to All the Railways 
in the World, Eighth Edition, Effingham Wilson. 
 
 
  
29 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Number of Railway Securities Listed on LSE,  and Railway Share 
Index 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Railway share index and number of securities listed on London Stock Exchange calculated from weekly share price tables 
in Railway Times (1843-50). Market index constructed from market returns, which have been calculated by weighting the returns 
of the component companies by their market capitalisation at the start of the day. 
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Figure 2: Total Par Value and Nominal Value of Railway Shares Listed on 
LSE, 1843-50 
 
 
Notes: Nominal Value and Par Value for each company listed on London Stock Exchange obtained from weekly share price 
tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Industry Nominal and Par Values calculated by summing individual companies. 
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Figure 3: Daily Share Prices of a GWR Full Share and Two Half Shares, 1843-50 
 
 
Panel A: Prices Observed in Market 
 
Panel B: Prices Adjusted for Uncalled Capital Discounted at Actual 
Risk-Free and Dividend Rates 
  
 
 
 
Notes: Share prices obtained on a daily basis from weekly share price tables in Railway 
Times (1843-50). 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway 
Times (1843-50). Implied price of a GWR original share calculated using Equation 2. 
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Figure 4: Price/Par Ratio of New Railways, 1844-50 
 
Panel A: Shares Treated as Futures, using Alternative 
Scenarios of Discount Rate 
Panel B: Shares Treated as European Call Options, using Alternative 
Scenarios of Expected Volatility 
 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values for individual companies obtained from weekly share price 
tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Implied market capitalisation and par value calculated for 
individual new railways, promoted after 1843, using alternative scenarios of the interest and 
dividend rates. Implied price/par ratio of all new railways calculated as implied total market 
price/total cost. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values for individual companies obtained from weekly share price tables in 
Railway Times (1843-50). When treated as  a future the implied price/par ratio calculated as total 
price/total cost using an interest rate of 3 per cent and dividend rate of 0 per cent to discount uncalled 
capital. When treated as an option the price of a partially paid share is assumed to be the price of a 
European call option. The time to exercise was set to the difference between the current date and the time 
that the next call was due, plus one year, as the enforcement of forfeiture probably did not occur 
immediately. The strike price was equivalent to the remaining uncalled liability, adjusted to reflect the 5 
per cent penalty interest which was imposed during the year between the instalment due date and the 
enforcement deadline. To obtain a range of scenarios volatilities of 20 per cent, 30 per cent and 40 per cent 
are shown. The Black-Scholes equation (Black and Scholes, 1973) was used to imply the price of an 
underlying fully paid share for each company. Total market capitalisation and par value of all new 
railways was calculated for each day by summing all new railways‟ implied market capitalisations and par 
values. Implied price/par ratio of all new railways calculated as implied total price/total cost. 
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Figure 5: Weekly Railways Calls and Railway Share Index 1843-50 
 
 
 
Notes: Railway share index and volume of calls calculated from weekly share price tables in Railway Times 
(1843-50). 
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Table 1: Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) Tests of Residual from Estimated Cointegrating Relationships between Fully Paid and 
Partially Paid Shares of Established Railway Companies 
 
  
Variables Included in Cointegrating Relationship 
  
  
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
 
 
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
X3 = Rf 
X4 = Div 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP + Ue
(-r+q)t
, where (-r+q) is equal to: 
  
Fully Paid Share  
(Y = PriceF) 
Partially Paid Share  
(X = PriceP) 
   
Actual 
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             Edinburgh and Glasgow Half Shares -1.60 
 
 -4.78 ***  -5.33 ***  -4.33 *** -2.57 
 
-3.59 ** -4.13 *** -4.72 *** -3.02 
 
1,186 
Great Western Half Share Full Shares -3.82 ** 
 
-16.36 *** 
 
-16.82 *** 
 
-14.50 *** -5.11 *** -8.67 *** -13.21 *** -12.04 *** -2.22 
 
2,284 
Great Western Half Share Fifth Shares -3.79 ** 
 
-17.83 *** 
 
-18.26 *** 
 
-15.93 *** -5.18 *** -10.09 *** -14.21 *** -17.20 *** -4.49 *** 2,270 
Great Western Half Share Sixth Shares -1.13 
 
 
-9.83 *** 
 
-10.18 *** 
 
-8.90 *** -4.37 *** -6.78 *** -8.29 *** -9.75 *** -4.01 *** 1,119 
Great Western Half Share Quarter Shares -2.38 
 
 
-13.28 *** 
 
-13.18 *** 
 
-11.91 *** -5.17 *** -9.31 *** -11.61 *** -11.23 *** -3.79 ** 1,379 
London and North Western New Shares -0.87 
 
 
-7.52 *** 
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-8.17 *** -1.04 
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-6.18 *** -6.11 *** -2.62 
 
1,050 
London and North Western Fifth Shares -1.27 
 
 
-9.07 *** 
 
-10.79 *** 
 
-6.11 *** -1.15 
 
-5.69 *** -7.07 *** -4.07 *** -2.49 
 
1,359 
London and North Western Quarter Shares -1.47 
 
 
-6.25 *** 
 
-6.55 *** 
 
-5.03 *** -4.08 *** -4.74 *** -4.91 *** -5.04 *** -4.02 *** 537 
Midland Half Shares -1.43 
 
 -5.03 ***  -5.72 ***  -4.34 *** -1.93 
 
-3.35 * -4.23 *** -4.02 *** -1.95 
 
1,284 
Midland New Shares -2.02 
 
 
-8.84 *** 
 
-9.24 *** 
 
-8.45 *** -2.13 
 
-5.67 *** -8.27 *** -6.65 *** -3.32 * 989 
York and Newcastle New Shares -2.70 
 
 
-6.85 *** 
 
-6.79 *** 
 
-6.37 *** -4.69 *** -6.65 *** -6.65 *** -6.07 *** -4.21 *** 327 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 1 Shares -2.51 
 
 
-12.00 *** 
 
-12.04 *** 
 
-9.92 *** -4.32 *** -7.04 *** -9.04 *** -10.55 *** -3.90 ** 1,008 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 2 Shares -1.93 
 
 
-6.90 *** 
 
-7.58 *** 
 
-5.19 *** -1.72 
 
-3.47 ** -4.70 *** -5.23 *** -2.90 
 
438 
York and North Midland Half Shares -4.95 *** 
 
-14.35 *** 
 
-14.51 *** 
 
-12.30 *** -8.71 *** -10.86 *** -11.67 *** -12.59 *** -13.73 *** 1,279 
York and North Midland E&W Riding Shares -0.89 
 
 
-5.94 *** 
 
-7.86 *** 
 
-3.82 ** -2.38 
 
-2.95 
 
-3.31 * -4.20 *** -4.32 *** 1,035 
York and North Midland Extension Shares -1.54 
 
 
-4.97 *** 
 
-7.40 *** 
 
-2.61 
 
-0.90 
 
-1.42 
 
-2.00 
 
-2.95 
 
-4.09 *** 886 
York and North Midland Scarborough Branch Shares -3.31 *  -4.27 **  -4.31 *  -2.90 
 
-3.12 
 
-2.96 
 
-2.92 
 
-2.90 
 
-4.50 *** 870 
    
 
  
 
  
 
             
    
 
  
 
  
 
             Notes: Daily share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Engle-Granger 2-step procedure (Engle and Granger, 1987) used to test for cointegration between a partially paid share and 
equivalent fully paid share for a particular established railway. When a partially paid share had a nominal value which was a fraction of a full share then the calculation was based on the relationship between a fully paid share and N partially 
paid shares, where N is the number of partially paid shares which would be equivalent to one fully paid share. Alternative specifications of the cointegrating relationship were tested. ADF test of the residuals from the cointegrating 
relationship are shown. Critical values for the ADF test of residuals given in Stock and Watson (2003, p.557). A significant ADF test rejects the presence of a unit root in the residual and suggests that the variables cointegrate. Significance 
shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 2: Cointegrating Vector from Estimated Cointegrating Relationships between Fully Paid and Partially Paid Shares of Established 
Railway Companies 
 
  
Variables Included in Cointegrating Relationship 
  
  
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
 
 
Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP 
X2 = UncalledP 
X3 = Rf 
X4 = Div 
 Y = PriceF 
X1 = PriceP + Ue
(-r+q)t
, where (-r+q) is equal to: 
  
Fully Paid Share  
(Y = PriceF) 
Partially Paid Share  
(X = PriceP) 
   
Actual 
 
-50% 
 
-10% 
 
0% 
 
10% 
 
50% 
 
Obs 
    
    
 
  
             Edinburgh and Glasgow Half Shares 1.51 
 
 0.93 
 
 0.79 
 
 1.00 
 
1.43 
 
1.18 
 
1.05 
 
0.90 
 
0.36 
 
1,186 
Great Western Half Share Full Shares 1.12 
 
 1.01 
 
 0.99 
 
 1.02 
 
1.12 
 
1.07 
 
1.04 
 
0.99 
 
0.32 
 
2,284 
Great Western Half Share Fifth Shares 0.87 
 
 1.00 
 
 0.96 
 
 1.00 
 
0.97 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
1.00 
 
0.90 
 
2,270 
Great Western Half Share Sixth Shares -0.17 
 
 1.04 
 
 1.07 
 
 1.18 
 
1.83 
 
1.42 
 
1.26 
 
1.07 
 
0.34 
 
1,119 
Great Western Half Share Quarter Shares 1.94 
 
 1.09 
 
 1.06 
 
 1.16 
 
1.95 
 
1.39 
 
1.23 
 
1.06 
 
0.48 
 
1,379 
London and North Western New Shares 1.20 
 
 1.46 
 
 1.12 
 
 1.22 
 
1.32 
 
2.03 
 
1.54 
 
1.03 
 
0.17 
 
1,050 
London and North Western Fifth Shares 0.99 
 
 1.10 
 
 0.98 
 
 0.87 
 
1.59 
 
1.40 
 
1.05 
 
0.72 
 
0.12 
 
1,359 
London and North Western Quarter Shares -0.11 
 
 1.01 
 
 0.76 
 
 1.17 
 
1.42 
 
1.28 
 
1.22 
 
1.14 
 
0.65 
 
537 
Midland Half Shares 0.09 
 
 1.22 
 
 0.96 
 
 1.37 
 
2.72 
 
1.93 
 
1.48 
 
1.06 
 
0.18 
 
1,284 
Midland New Shares -0.46 
 
 1.11 
 
 1.09 
 
 1.12 
 
0.88 
 
1.32 
 
1.18 
 
0.99 
 
0.39 
 
989 
York and Newcastle New Shares -0.01 
 
 0.96 
 
 0.92 
 
 0.90 
 
1.35 
 
1.17 
 
1.01 
 
0.83 
 
0.27 
 
327 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 1 Shares 1.58 
 
 1.22 
 
 1.19 
 
 1.25 
 
1.64 
 
1.44 
 
1.32 
 
1.16 
 
0.40 
 
1,008 
York, Newcastle and Berwick Extension No. 2 Shares -0.12 
 
 1.25 
 
 0.96 
 
 1.39 
 
0.54 
 
1.49 
 
1.47 
 
1.27 
 
0.40 
 
438 
York and North Midland Half Shares 0.66 
 
 0.89 
 
 0.87 
 
 0.89 
 
0.80 
 
0.86 
 
0.88 
 
0.90 
 
0.97 
 
1,279 
York and North Midland E&W Riding Shares -0.62 
 
 0.98 
 
 0.54 
 
 1.46 
 
1.01 
 
1.51 
 
1.51 
 
1.43 
 
0.88 
 
1,035 
York and North Midland Extension Shares -0.32 
 
 0.50 
 
 0.47 
 
 0.83 
 
-0.10 
 
0.35 
 
0.62 
 
0.91 
 
0.57 
 
886 
York and North Midland Scarborough Branch Shares -0.15 
 
 0.43 
 
 0.46 
 
 -0.07 
 
-0.24 
 
-0.18 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.03 
 
0.89 
 
870 
    
 
  
 
  
 
             
 
Average 0.47 
 
 1.01 
 
 0.89 
 
 1.04 
 
1.19 
 
1.22 
 
1.10 
 
0.97 
 
0.49 
  
 
Average (without YNM) 0.65 
 
 1.11 
 
 0.99 
 
 1.13 
 
1.44 
 
1.39 
 
1.22 
 
1.02 
 
0.38 
  
    
 
  
 
  
 
             Notes: Daily share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Engle-Granger 2-step procedure (Engle and Granger, 1987) used to test for cointegration between a 
partially paid share and equivalent fully paid share for a particular established railway. When a partially paid share had a nominal value which was a fraction of a full share then the calculation was based on the 
relationship between a fully paid share and N partially paid shares, where N is the number of partially paid shares which would be equivalent to one fully paid share. Alternative specifications of the cointegrating 
relationship were tested. Cointegrating vector from the first step of regression is shown. 
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Table 3: Forfeiture Rates on Railway Share Instalments, using Alternative 
Scenarios for Deadline on Payment 
 
 
 
  
   
 
 
 
 
Time between Instalment 
Due Date and 
Deadline for Payment 
 
  
Criteria Met 
 
Forfeiture Rate 
 
Difference in  
Forfeiture Rates 
SE of 
Difference 
 
N 
 
S-K>=0 S-K<0 
 
S-K>=0 S-K<0 
 
 
 
         
 
 2 Months  225 
 
214 11 
 
10.5% 13.6% 
 
3.2%  (4.1%) 
4 Months  221 
 
197 24 
 
8.5% 19.0% 
 
10.5% *** (2.4%) 
1 Year  163 
 
132 31 
 
5.5% 14.8% 
 
9.3% *** (1.8%) 
2 Years  74 
 
52 22 
 
2.7% 6.3% 
 
3.5% ** (1.7%) 
 
 
         
 
 Notes: It would have been better for the investor to forfeit the partially paid share when S – K < 0, where S is the price of a fully 
paid share and K is the instalment due. Share prices and par values obtained from Railway Times (1843-50). Forfeiture rates 
calculated from data on arrears on calls for capital published in Parliamentary Papers (1848, LXIII, p.275-442), assuming that 
any arrears which were still outstanding after the deadline had been forfeited. 
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Table 4: New Railways’ First Day Abnormal Returns 
   
 
Return on 
Partially Paid Shares 
 
 
Return on Fully Paid Shares if 
Partially Paid Shares Treated as Futures 
 
 
Return on Fully Paid Shares if 
Partially Paid Shares Treated as Options 
Year N 
Average 
Paid up (%) 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
SE of  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial and 
Full 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
SE of  
Mean  
Difference 
between 
Partial 
and Full 
 
   
 
  
  
  
  
  
 
 
       
1844 38 10.2%  76.2% (17.4%) *** 
 
5.5% (1.9%) *** 
 
70.8% (15.7%) *** 
 
-4.5% 2.9%   80.8% 14.9% *** 
1845 79 6.2%  106.7% (13.1%) *** 
 
7.1% (0.9%) *** 
 
99.6% (12.3%) *** 
 
-6.3% 2.0% ***  113.0% 11.5% *** 
1846 40 15.8%  1.9% (9.9%)  
 
3.4% (2.2%)  
 
-1.4% (8.7%)  
 
-9.1% 3.9% **  11.0% 7.4%  
1847 9 20.0%  8.3% (20.7%)  
 
1.3% (4.9%)  
 
7.0% (17.0%)  
 
-3.3% 7.1%   11.7% 15.4%  
1848 1 10.0%  37.3% .  
 
3.8% .  
 
33.5% .  
 
-8.5% .   45.8% .  
   
 
  
 
   
 
   
 
 
       
Total 167 10.2%  69.0% (8.5%) *** 
 
5.5% (0.9%) *** 
 
63.5% (7.9%) *** 
 
-6.4% 1.5%   75.4% 7.4%  
      
 
    
   
    
   
    
 
 
       
 
Notes: Daily share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). First day actual returns calculated using Equation 6. Returns for implied fully paid up shares 
calculated using Equation 7. In this scenario the risk-free rate of 3 per cent was used to discount the value of future instalments to their present value. Abnormal returns calculated by subtracting the market 
return on the day when first traded from actual and nominal returns. Significance shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: Total Nominal and Par Values of New Railways, 1844-50 
 
 
 
Dec 27,  
1844 
Dec 26,  
1845 
Dec 25,  
1846 
Dec 31,  
1847 
Dec 29,  
1848 
Dec 28,  
1849 
Dec 27,  
1850 
        
Total for All New Railways 
       
Nominal Value (£m) 39.6 158.0 129.0 94.4 79.0 78.8 69.4 
Par Value (£m) 3.7 15.6 24.8 36.0 48.5 57.0 53.9 
        
Average for New Railways 
       
Nominal Value (£m) 0.9 0.8 1.1 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.2 
Par Value (£m) 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.9 
        
Number of New Railway Companies 
       
Listed on LSE 44.0 186.0 112.0 81.0 69.0 68.0 60.0 
Listed if All Securities Fully Paid up and  
Total Par Value Remained Constant 
4.1 18.5 21.6 30.9 42.4 49.2 46.6 
        
Par/Nominal Ratio 9.2% 9.9% 19.2% 38.1% 61.4% 72.3% 77.7% 
        Notes: Nominal Value and Par Value for each company listed on London Stock Exchange obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-50). Industry Nominal and Par Values calculated by 
summing individual companies. Average values obtained by dividing totals by number of new companies listed. Estimates for number of companies which would have been listed if all securities had been fully 
paid up, and total par value remained constant, estimated by dividing total par value by average nominal value. Par/Nominal Ratio calculate by dividing total par value by nominal value. 
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Table 6: Event Study on Company Returns when Calls for Capital Were Issued 
 
   
One Week  
 
Three Weeks  
 
Five Weeks  
Year 
Number  
of calls  
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
 
Mean 
SE of  
mean 
 
     
 
   
 
   
 
1843 22 
 
-4.2% (2.5%)  
 
-0.7% (3.5%)  
 
2.4% (3.0%)  
1844 36 
 
-4.6% (2.1%) ** 
 
-2.5% (3.5%)  
 
4.8% (4.8%)  
1845 110 
 
-4.1% (1.6%) ** 
 
-2.4% (1.7%)  
 
-1.3% (2.2%)  
1846 197 
 
-7.4% (1.9%) *** 
 
-6.0% (2.1%) *** 
 
-3.9% (2.2%) * 
1847 218 
 
-9.1% (1.2%) *** 
 
-7.9% (1.5%) *** 
 
-6.2% (1.7%) *** 
1848 182 
 
-16.1% (1.8%) *** 
 
-14.3% (2.1%) *** 
 
-6.5% (3.4%) * 
1849 149 
 
-11.9% (2.3%) *** 
 
-11.4% (2.3%) *** 
 
-6.9% (2.6%) *** 
1850 57 
 
-10.9% (3.8%) *** 
 
-10.4% (3.6%) *** 
 
-6.1% (6.1%)  
     
 
   
 
   
 
Overall 971 
 
-9.7% (0.7%) *** 
 
-8.4% (0.8%) *** 
 
-4.7% (1.1%) *** 
     
 
   
 
   
 
 
Notes: Share prices and par values obtained from weekly share price tables in Railway Times (1843-1850). Time of call defined as the week on which 
paid up value of the share changes in the share list. If company does not trade during the week a call is made, the fair value estimate is calculated as 
(previous price + size of call). The return is calculated for the next week in which the share is traded. One week return is the return during the week in 
which the call is made, three week return also includes previous week and subsequent week, five week return includes the two previous weeks and two 
subsequent weeks. Significance shown by *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, testing if the mean return is significantly different  from 0. 
 
 
